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I. INTRODUCTION
A dialogue concerning the intersection between the patent system
and the antitrust laws has endured since the early 1940s.1 Today, in the
era of the “new economy,” issues related to the intersection of the patent
system and the antitrust laws are as pressing as ever due to their
enormous impact on innovation. Consequently, scholars, practitioners,
governmental agencies, and other relevant stakeholders have devoted a
great deal of attention to the intersection between the two laws and
engaged in dynamic discussions designed to explore their complex
* Assistant Professor of Business Law, Northeastern Illinois University, Chicago, IL. New York
University School of Law, LLM degree; Thurgood Marshall School of Law, JD degree. This article
was presented as a work in progress at the Association for Global Business Conference in Orlando,
Florida in November of 2009. It has received the best paper award.
1. JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY (1942).
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relationship.2 In this article, I explain the interaction between the two
laws and describe the ways in which these two extremely important
areas of government regulation are and are not in tension. I argue that
the conflict between the two laws is overstated, but the proper balance is
far from being found. The reason for that is a notion that the current
state of the patent system is more of a hindrance than a spur to
innovation and competition due to overprotection and broadening of
patent rights, lowering of standards to grant patents, chronic inefficiency
of the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) that issues far too many
“questionable” patents and, as a result of all that, the skyrocketing
number of issued patents.3
Furthermore, I propose that any meaningful attempt to improve the
current state of the patent system must center on the fact that patentees
seek patents under many circumstances, rather than only when they wish
to protect a newly developed technology from imitation and exploit it
commercially.4 It is now known that most firms rely on patents the least
among a variety of methods for protecting the returns from their
2. See DEP’T OF JUSTICE [DOJ], ANTITRUST AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2003) (address
by R. Hewitt Pate, Acting Assistant Attorney General Antitrust Division U.S. Department of
Justice, before the American Intellectual Property Law Association [AIPLA]), available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/200701.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2010); FED. TRADE
COMM’N [FTC], TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND
PATENT LAW AND POLICY (Oct. 2003), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf; RICHARD
GILBERT, CPC CONFERENCE: ANTITRUST AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN A CHANGING
POLITICAL CLIMATE (2009) (summary of the Antitrust and Intellectual Property in a Changing
Political Climate Conference, held at UC Berkeley on February 5 and 6, 2009, co-sponsored by the
Competition Policy Center and the Antitrust and Intellectual Property Law sections of the American
Bar Association, by Richard Gilbert, Professor of Economics and Chair of the Competition Policy
Center),
available
at
http://iber.berkeley.edu/cpc/antitrust_conference_2009/Conference%20Summary.pdf (last visited
Feb. 21, 2010). See generally DOJ & FTC, ROUNDTABLE ON COMPETITION, PATENTS AND
INNOVATION, DAF/COMP/WD(2006)52 (Oct. 3, 2006) (note was jointly submitted by the DOJ and
the FTC to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD] Competition
Committee), http://www.ftc.gov/bc/international/docs/IP_US.pdf.
3. The number of issued patents has almost doubled in the last twenty years from 96,725 in
1990 to 190,121 in 2009. See U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE [USPTO], USPTO ANNUAL
REPORT: PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2009 (2009), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/annual/2009/oai_05_wlt_06.html (last visited February 21,
2010).
4. See generally WESLEY COHEN, RICHARD NELSON & JOHN WALSH, NAT’L BUREAU OF
ECON. RESEARCH [NBER], PROTECTING THEIR INTELLECTUAL ASSETS: APPROPRIABILITY
CONDITION AND WHY U.S. MANUFACTURING FIRMS PATENT (OR NOT), Working Paper 7552
(2000), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w7552. The authors conducted a survey of nearly
1500 R&D labs in the US manufacturing sector. Id. at 14, 17. This study has been widelycited in
OECD Policy Roundtable on Competition, Patents and Innovation. See generally DOJ & FTC,
supra note 2.
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inventions and that in no industry are patents identified as the most
effective appropriability mechanism.5 Because of the current state of the
patent system, patents have become largely a strategic tool that patentees
can use solely for anticompetitive reasons, such as blocking competitors’
development activities, protecting against infringement suits, and using
patents as leverage in negotiations over technology rights.6 My
argument is that preventing reliance on patents for anticompetitive
reasons that do not concomitantly advance the “Progress of Science and
useful Arts”7 is crucial for the improvement of the patent system and
striking the balance with antitrust laws. We are mistaken to believe that
seeking an optimal level of patent protection and improving the
efficiency of the PTO by raising its budget and providing more qualified
patent examiners will be enough to improve the patent system and
preclude reliance on patents for “illegitimate” reasons because “patents
are either two weak or too strong”8 and “improper patents will always be
issued,”9 regardless of how efficient the PTO might be.
Commentators have described the current state of the patent system
as a “perfect storm.”10 However, it is more like a fire that keeps burning
down the city of innovation. Trying to resolve the problem and prevent
the fire from spreading by merely providing more fire trucks and
firemen to the fire department, or making it much more difficult to
obtain pyrotechnical devices is naive. While those measures are
certainly important, the problem will not be resolved until it is
determined who is perpetrating the fire and how and why. Only then an
adequate response and meaningful punishments can be implemented in
order to deter future wrongdoings. This article, therefore, argues in
favor of allowing a more extensive inquiry into the patentee’s subjective

5. COHEN ET AL., supra note 4, at 3, 6.
6. Id. at 17.
7. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
8. See Shubha Ghosh, Intellectual Property Rights: The View from Competition Policy, 103
NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 344, 348-49 (2009).
9. See 2000 United States Patent and Trademark Office: Hearing on H.R. 63-845 Before
the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Prop. of the H.R. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 2,
at 112 (2000) (statement of Rochelle Dreyfuss, Professor, Director of the Engelberg Center for
Innovation
Law
and
Policy,
N.Y.U.
School
of
Law),
available
at
http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/judiciary/hju63845.000/hju63845_0.HTM (last visited Feb.
22, 2010).
10. See Eric Chabrow, The U.S. Patent System in Crisis, INFORMATION WEEK, Feb. 20, 2006
(providing a summary of testimony by John Lerner, Professor, Harvard Business School, before a
House
subcommittee),
available
at
http://www.informationweek.com/news/globalcio/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=180204145 (last visited Feb. 22, 2010).
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intent for patenting, which is fairly limited under the current law in both
pre-grant and post-grant issues. In particular, this article suggests that
competition policy with a focus on antitrust intent should be considered
in the initial review of patent applications, and the approach to intent
standards in post-grant issues must be more objective across the board,
so that antitrust law’s “swords” can be used more often in patent cases
involving allegations of patentee’s misconduct in order to deter future
misconducts. However, this article does not suggest by any means that
antitrust competition authorities should assume responsibilities in the
initial review of patent applications, or that the patentee’s “improper”
subjective intent for patenting should make a perfectly valid patent
unenforceable. To the contrary, my argument is that the patentee’s
subjective intent for patenting should not be viewed as a red light at the
intersection between the patent system and antitrust laws, but it must be
an important arrow that directs the traffic when other signs are invisible.
I use Dippin’ Dots Inc. v. Mosey, arguably the second most controversial
patent case of the last decade, to illustrate this point and to explain the
cost of the current approach to intent standards in patents.11
The Article is divided as follows. Part II provides a historical
overview of goals and policy behind both the patent system and antitrust
laws. Part III underlines the areas of actual conflict between the two
laws. Part IV explores possible adjustments that could reduce the
conflict between the two laws and lead to a proper balance.

11. 476 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2007). The most controversial patent case of the last decade is
probably In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 966 (Fed. Cir. 2008). The Federal Circuit court affirmed the
rejection of the patent claims involving a method of hedging risks in commodities trading. See
Erick Schonfeld, Your Business Method Patent Has Just Been Invalidated, THE WASHINGTON POST,
Oct.
30,
2008,
available
at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/10/30/AR2008103003751.html (last
visited Feb. 28, 2010). It has been widely reported that the In re Bilski decision will call into
question the validity of many already issued business method patents. Id. The Supreme Court of
the United States granted certiorari on June 1, 2009 and oral argument on the patent applicants’
appeal was heard on November 9, 2009. See Transcript of Oral Argument, In re Bilski, 130 S. Ct.
3218
(2009)
(No.
08-964),
available
at
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts.aspx (last visited Oct. 10,
2010).
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II. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
A.

Goals and Policy Behind Antitrust Laws

The federal antitrust laws first saw the light of day in the last half of
the 19th century.12 During that period, industrialization was in full-swing
in the United States and the common law was deemed inadequate to deal
with the growth of trusts, such as John D. Rockefeller’s Standard Oil
Trust formed in 1882, cartels and industrial monopolies that were
becoming strong enough to influence prices and outputs and create
inefficiencies.13 Consequently, Congress enacted the Sherman Act in
1890 as a legislative response to new conditions in the marketplace.14
The Sherman Act prohibited unreasonable agreements in restraint of
trade under section I,15 and monopolizing, attempts to monopolize, and
combinations or conspiracies to monopolize under section II in interstate
commerce.16 The Sherman Act went significantly further than common
law because it established, among other things, absolute prohibitions
enforceable by private damage actions.17 Subsequently, Congress added
amendments to the Sherman Act at various times through 1950 to
strengthen it. The most important of these amendments are the Clayton
Act of 1914,18 the Robinson-Patman Act of 1936,19 and Federal Trade
Commission Act of 1914.20
What the main goals of antitrust are has never been clearly
articulated, due to the fact that the U.S. competition statutes are not clear
about their goals. The Supreme Court has described the language of the
12. See infra note 13, at 4.
13. For extensive background on the history of antitrust laws see William H. Page, The
Ideological Origins and Evolution of U.S. Antitrust Law, 1 ISSUES IN COMPETITION L. & POL’Y 1,
2008 A.B.A. SEC. ANTITRUST L., at 4-17, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=692821 (last visited
Feb. 26, 2010).
14. Id. at 3. In 1890, Congress took aim at the trusts with passage of the Sherman Act,
named for Senator John Sherman (R-Ohio). The Sherman Act outlawed trusts altogether. Sherman
Act of 1890, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1887-1891) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2010)).
15. Sherman Act of 1890, ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1887-1891) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 1 (2010)).
16. Id. at § 2.
17. See Id. at § 7.
18. 15 U.S.C. § 12 (2010). In addition to tightening legal standards of the Sherman Act, the
Clayton Act prohibits exclusive dealing arrangements, tie-in sales, or mergers where the effect may
be to substantially lessen the competition or to create a monopoly. Clayton Act of 1914, ch. 323, §§
2-7, 38 Stat. 730 (1914).
19. 15 U.S.C. § 13 (2010) (prohibiting certain price discriminations).
20. Id. §§ 41-51 (prohibiting unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce or
unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce).
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U.S. competition laws as having “a generality and adaptability
comparable to that found . . . in constitutional provisions.”21
Consequently, U.S. competition policy has never had one exclusive goal.
Rather, it has had a different set of goals that reflected the political,
social and economic concerns at the particular historical moment. These
goals centered around limiting large concentrations of economic power
and dispersing economic and political power,22 protecting small
businesses,23 protecting individual autonomy and economic
opportunity,24 and protecting labor.25
Today, there is widespread consensus that the main purpose of the
U.S. antitrust laws is to ensure a competitive market.26 Commentators

21. Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359-60 (1933).
22. Congress was concerned about the monopoly power of the great industrial trusts. See,
e.g., 51 CONG. REC. 14,222 (1914) (remarks of Sen. Thompson) (noting that giant corporations had
a “monopoly upon practically everything we produce, everything we eat and wear, and everything
we use in the construction of the homes in which we live . . . .”). Congress also believed that trusts
sought not only industrial domination, but “political supremacy.” Some members of Congress
feared that the wealthy and privileged few would usurp political power, leading to socialism “as the
properties of all the people pass into the hands of a few trust magnates.” See 51 CONG. REC. 9167
(1914) (remarks of Rep. Nelson).
23. See 51 CONG. REC. 14,217 (1914) (remarks of Sen. Thompson) (“The trust wave swept
over the country like a terrible cyclone, causing greater loss and destruction of property
accumulated by individual effort than all of the storms and cyclones that have occurred since the
flood. Men who had devoted a lifetime to a particular trade or business found themselves bankrupt
in a single night and, what was really worse, left in an entirely helpless condition . . . .”). At times,
the courts have even suggested that protecting small business supersedes even consumers’ interests
in lower prices. See United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290, 323 (1897),
overruled by Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 37 Cal. 3d 644 (1984).
24. Members of Congress viewed competition and dispersed power as the “best environment
for the advancement and the welfare of mankind in the individual initiative, the individual
independence, and the individual responsibility.” See 51 CONG. REC. 9167 (1914) (remarks of Rep.
Nelson). Some viewed competition law’s purpose as “encouraging investment, encouraging
intelligent action and opportunity, but with the old Democratic principle underlying it all – ‘Equal
rights to all and special privileges to none.’” Id. at 9270 (remarks of Rep. Carlin). These concerns
were equally evident around 1950 when the disappearance of small firms was viewed as threatening
the fabric of a decentralized democracy and depriving individuals of control over their lives. See 95
CONG. REC. 11,493 (1949) (remarks of Sen. Carroll); id. at 11,485 (remarks of Rep. Celler).
25. It was believed that the trusts enjoyed a substantial degree of protection from strikes
because of their economic strength. See EARL W. KINTNER, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS AND RELATED STATUTES 993 (1978). It was argued that an unintended
consequence of the Sherman Act was its use by federal courts to enjoin strikes and limit the ability
of workers to organize. Id. Congress corrected this in the Clayton Act when it declared that labor
organizations are not conspiracies in restraint of trade and made clear that workers could act jointly
in bargaining with employers without fear of prosecution under the antitrust laws. 15 U.S.C. § 17
(2010).
26. As stated in the DOJ/FTC International Guidelines: “For more than a century, the U.S.
antitrust laws have stood as the ultimate protector of the competitive process that underlies our free
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have used an aphorism “protect competition, not competitors”
articulated by the Supreme Court to successfully reorient the goals of
antitrust laws.27 However, interpreting competition has often troubled
courts and commentators. Judge Bork has suggested in his book The
Antitrust Paradox that competition should be interpreted as a “term of
art, designating any state of affairs in which consumer welfare cannot be
increased by moving to an alternative state of affairs through judicial
decree.”28 Subsequently, consumer welfare has emerged as a main goal
of antitrust, and behavior was not deemed anticompetitive absent
consumer harm.29 However, the courts and commentators still disagree
over how broadly or how narrowly consumer welfare should be
interpreted.30 This debate has particularly escalated in the wake of the
fairly recent Supreme Court decision in Weyerhaeuser Co. v. RossSimmons Hardwood Lumber Co., where the court examined the issue of
whether the same legal standards should be applied in monopoly and
monopsony cases.31
Monopsony is the “mirror image” of monopoly, but on the demand
side of the curve.32 It is essentially power over suppliers, not consumers.

market economy. Through this process, which enhances consumer choice and promotes
competitive prices, society as a whole benefits from the best possible allocation of resources.” See
DOJ & FTC, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS (1995), available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/internat.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2010).
27. Brown Shoe Co., Inc. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962).
28. ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 61 (1978).
29. See Steven C. Salop, Buyer Power and Antitrust: Anticompetitive Overbuying by Power
Buyers, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 669, 686-87 (2005). See generally Richard O. Zerbe, Jr., Buyer Power
and Antitrust: Monopsony and the Ross-Simmons Case: A Comment on Salop and Kirkwood, 72
ANTITRUST L.J. 717 (2005).
30. See Brook Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 224 (1993);
John Kirkwood, The Robinson-Patman Act and Consumer Welfare: Has Volvo Reconciled Them?,
30 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 349, 360-61 (2007). See also Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Univ. Health, Inc., 938
F.2d. 1206, 1223 (11th Cir. 1991); United States v. United Tote, Inc., 768 F. Supp. 1064, 1084-85
(D. Del. 1991).
31. See Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312, 315
(2007). In Weyerhaeuser, a large saw mill operator in the Pacific Northwest was accused of driving
out its rivals by simultaneously bidding up the price of inputs (alder saw logs) and cutting the prices
on the output (alder lumber). Id. at 315-16.
32. In economics, buyer power is analyzed through monopsony model, where a single buyer
purchases inputs for its outputs from many sellers. Under this approach, monopsony is the “mirror
image” of monopoly, but on the demand side of the curve. See ROGER D. BLAIR & JEFFERY L.
HARRISON, MONOPSONY: ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS (1993). See also HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE §
1.2(b)-14 (1994) (defining a monopsonist as “a monopoly buyer rather than a seller”); Roger D.
Blair & Jeffrey L. Harrison, Antitrust Policy and Monopsony, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 297, 297-98
(1991).
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Some commentators have described it as an upstream market power in
input markets, “the circumstance in which the demand side of a market
is sufficiently concentrated that buyers can exercise market power over
sellers.”33 Others simply define buyer power as a factor which “enables
a firm or a group of firms to obtain from a supplier more favorable terms
than those available to other buyers.”34 Under this approach, if the buyer
(e.g., a retailer) can force sellers (e.g., suppliers) to reduce price below
the level that would emerge in a competitive market, a buyer has market
power.35 Commentators often use Wal-Mart as an example of a firm that
has buyer power over its suppliers.36 Since buyer power is an upstream
power in inputs markets that actually harms suppliers but potentially
enhances consumer welfare, the issue becomes whether the conduct on
the buy side of the market should be treated just as strictly as conduct on
the sell side of the market.37 The Court in Weyerhaeuser held that
conduct on the buy side of the market should be reviewed as stringently
as conduct on the sell side of the market even if there is no direct
consumer harm because illegal exercise of buyer power can in the long
run be just as harmful to consumers as anticompetitive conduct
occurring in the output market.38
The decision in Weyerhaeuser has implications on the debate about
whether the narrow interpretation of consumer welfare standard is in
accordance with antitrust goals and policies.39 Commentators have long

33. Roger Noll, Buyer Power and Economic Policy, 72 ANTITRUST L. J. No. 2 588, 589
(2005).
34. That is, a firm’s ability to achieve “more favorable terms” from suppliers than from other
buyers. See Margaret Bloom, Retailer Buyer Power, 2001 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 395, 397 (B.
Hawk ed., 2000).
35. Id. 396-97.
36. Stephanie Wagner, Note, Big Box Living Wage Ordinances: Upholding Our Constitutive
Commitment to a Remunerative Job, 15 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 359, 368 (2008) (arguing
that Wal-Mart, due to its immense market share, has the ability to demand prices from its suppliers,
essentially wielding monopsony power in the marketplace because it can act as a sole buyer, giving
it the power to tell suppliers what price Wal-Mart is willing to pay them).
37. To address this issue, some commentators argued that “[w]here buyer conduct clearly
harms suppliers but does not benefit consumers, the impact on suppliers should be dispositive.” See
Kirkwood, supra note 30. See also Telecor Commc’ns, Inc. v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 305 F.3d 1124,
1133-34 (10th Cir. 2002). On the other hand, at least one court has held that in cases involving
conduct that clearly harms suppliers but consumers might benefit from it, the impact on consumers
is decisive. Baltimore Cinema, Inc. v. Allied Artist Pictures Corp., 885 F.2d 313, 317 (6th Cir.
1989) (holding that an agreement among film distributors to refrain from bidding against each other
for films was not illegal because it might increase consumer welfare by lowering prices).
38. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312, 315 (2007).
39. Kenneth Heyer, Welfare Standards and Merger Analysis: Why Not the Best?, 2
COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 29, 30 (2006). See also THOMAS ROSCH, FTC, MONOPSONY AND THE
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proposed a broader interpretation of “consumer welfare,” something
akin to “total welfare,” and argued that seeking efficiencies is the best
way to enhance consumer welfare.40 The efficiencies approach suggests
that the long-run interest of consumers in the benefits from efficiencies
may be as important as their immediate interest in lower prices.41
Professor Brodley has articulated three types of efficiencies that
ultimately increase consumer welfare—production, innovation, and
allocative efficiencies.42 Although it seems that antitrust authorities
have acknowledged that competition policy may not have a single goal
and are working to accommodate the goals of enhancing efficiencies and
promoting consumer welfare, it was suggested that “delayed benefits
from efficiencies (due to delay in the achievement of, or the realization
of consumer benefits from, the efficiencies) will be given less weight
because they are less proximate and more difficult to predict.”43
Nevertheless, the current goal of antitrust can be summarized as
promoting consumer welfare by enhancing efficiencies.
B.

Goals and Policy Behind Patent Laws

The roots of intellectual property in the United States stem from the
U.S. Constitution where the Framers authorized Congress “To promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to

MEANING OF “CONSUMER WELFARE”: A CLOSER LOOK AT WEYERHAEUSER 1-2 (Dec. 7, 2006)
(address before the 2006 Milton Handler Annual Antitrust Review) (“Courts and federal law
enforcement officials routinely invoke ‘consumer welfare’ as the guiding principle behind their
application
of
the
antitrust
laws.”),
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/rosch/061207miltonhandlerremarks.pdf.
40. Heyer, supra note 39, at 2. See generally Laura Alexander, Note, Monopsony and the
Consumer Harm Standard, 95 GEO. L.J. 1611 (2007).
41. See generally Alexander, supra note 40.
42. Id. See also Joseph F. Brodley, The Economic Goals of Antitrust: Efficiency, Consumer
Welfare, and Technological Progress, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1020, 1025 (1987) (“Production
efficiency is achieved when goods are produced using the most cost-effective combination of
productive resources available under existing technology. Innovation efficiency is achieved through
the invention, development, and diffusion of new products and production processes that increase
social wealth. Allocative efficiency is achieved when the existing stock of goods and productive
output are allocated through the price system to those buyers who value them most, in terms of
willingness to pay or willingness to forego other consumption.”). In the context of buyer power,
allocative inefficiency occurs when too few resources are devoted to an activity: too little output is
produced by a monopolist and too few inputs are hired by a monopsonist. This argument presumes
that this inefficiency is harmful to consumers even if no direct effects can be demonstrated. See
Brodley, supra.
43. See DOJ & FTC, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 32 n.37 (1997), available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg.htm#N_37_ (last visited Feb. 26, 2010).

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2011

9

Akron Intellectual Property Journal, Vol. 5 [2011], Iss. 1, Art. 2

7-TOKIC_MACROED 4.9.11.DOCM

28

AKRON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY JOURNAL

4/12/2011 12:45 PM

[5:19

Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
and Discoveries.”44 The Patent Act of 1790 was the first act enacted by
Congress and, for the first time in American history, the law gave
inventors rights to their creations.45 The Patent Act of 1790 defined the
subject matter of a U.S. patent as “any useful art, manufacture, engine,
machine, or device, or any improvement thereon not before known or
used” and granted the applicant “the sole and exclusive right and liberty
of making, constructing, using and vending to others to be used” of his
invention, for a period of fourteen years.46 Over the period of the last
two centuries, the requirements of novelty, utility, non-obviousness, and
the period of patents have been developed through patent law reforms.47

44. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
45. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 1, l Stat. 109-110 (repealed 1793).
46. Id.
47. See ROGER E. SCHECHTER & JOHN R. THOMAS, PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 16 (2004).
See also Patent Act of 1952, ch. 10, 66 Stat. 792, 797-98 (1952) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C.
§§ 100-04 (2010)). Section 102 provides ground for obtaining a patent:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless(a) the invention was known or used by others in this country, or patented or described in
a printed publication in this or a foreign country, before the invention thereof 4 the
applicant for patent, or
(b) the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign
country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year prior to the date of
the application for patent in the United States, or
(c) he has abandoned the invention, or
(d) the invention was first patented or caused to be patented, or was the subject of an
inventor’s certificate, by the applicant or his legal representatives or assigns in a foreign
country prior to the date of the application for patent in this country on an application for
patent or inventor’s certificate filed more than twelve months before the filing of the
application in the United States, or
(e) the invention was described in (1) an application for patent, published under section
122(b), by another filed in the United States before the invention by the applicant for
patent or (2) a patent granted on an application for patent by another filed in the United
States before the invention by the applicant for patent, except that an international
application filed under the treaty defined in section 351(a) shall have the effects for the
purposes of this subsection of an application filed in the United States only if the
international application designated the United States and was published under Article
2l(2) of such treaty in the English language; or
(f) he did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented, or
(g)(l) during the course of an interference conducted under section 135 or section 291,
another inventor involved therein establishes, to the extent permitted in section 104, that
before such person's invention thereof the invention was made by such other inventor
and not abandoned, suppressed or concealed, or (2) before such person's invention
thereof, the invention was made in this country by another inventor who had not
abandoned, suppressed, or concealed it. In determining priority of invention under this
subsection, there shall be considered not only the respective dates of conception and
reduction to practice of the invention, but also the reasonable diligence of one who was
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Ever since the early beginnings of the intellectual property laws,
commentators and scholars have been arguing over whether it is justified
to give exclusive rights in intellectual property, given that intellectual
property is not like other kinds of property.48 A great amount of
scholarly work has been devoted to the debate over whether intellectual
property should be considered a property like other kinds of property,
and it is now an accepted view that intellectual property is just another
form of property and should be treated no different than other kinds of
property.49 In addition to an argument that intellectual property is a
first to conceive and last to reduce to practice, from a time prior to conception by the
other.
35 U.S.C. § 102 (2010).
48. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention,
in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609,
614-16 (Richard R. Nelson ed., 1962) (discussing information’s properties of indivisibility and
inappropriability); Harry First, Controlling the Intellectual Property Grab: Protect Innovation, Not
Innovators, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 365 (2007); Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and
Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031 (2005) (discussing differences between tangible and intellectual
property). See, e.g., HERBERT HOVENKAMP, MARK D. JANIS, MARK A. LEMLEY & CHRISTOPHER R.
LESLIE, IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW 1-5 (2d ed. 2004); Mark A. Lemley, Romantic Authorship and the Rhetoric of
Property, 75 TEX. L. REV. 873, 895-904 (1997) (discussing growth in use of propertization
rhetoric); Tom Palmer, Are Patents and Copyrights Morally Justified?: The Philosophy of Property
Rights and Ideal Objects, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 817 (1990) (reviewing natural law and
utilitarian arguments for intellectual property rights); Stewart E. Sterk, Intellectualizing Property:
The Tenuous Connections Between Land and Copyright, 83 WASH. U. L. Q. 417 (2005) (discussing
implications of using property rights label, particularly for copyright law). For an argument that
Lockean natural rights philosophy, as well as Benthamite utilitarianism, influenced the development
of patent theories in the eighteenth century, see Adam Mossoff, Comment, Rethinking the
Development of Patents: An Intellectual History, 1550-1800, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 1255 (2001).
Compare John F. Duffy, Intellectual Property Isolationism and the Average Cost Thesis, 83 TEX. L.
REV. 1077 (2005) (arguing that intellectual property should be viewed as a species of property),
with Mark A. Lemley, What's Different About Intellectual Property?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1097 (2005).
The Department of Justice also moved from a position of hostility to patents and copyrights to an
embrace of patents and copyrights as just another form of “property.” See 4 TRADE REG. REP.
(CCH), ¶ 13,126, at 20,709 (1995) (remarks of Bruce B. Wilson, Deputy Ass’t Attn’y Gen,
Antitrust Div. of DOJ, made on Sept. 21, 1972). Charles F. Rule, then Deputy Assistant Attorney
General in the Antitrust Division, made the linguistic shift clear. Patents and copyrights are not
“evil monopolies,” he wrote. They “simply create property rights.” See Charles F. Rule, The
Administration's Views: Antitrust Analysis After the Nine No-No's, 55 ANTITRUST L.J. 365, 367
(1986).
49. Rule, supra note 48, at 367. The federal antitrust enforcement agencies have endorsed
the property-rights approach in their guidelines for the licensing of all “intellectual property,” taking
as their basic approach the view that “the same general antitrust principles” should apply to conduct
involving “intellectual property” as apply to conduct involving “any other form of tangible or
intangible property.” See DOJ & FTC, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, § 2.1, at 3 (Apr. 6, 1995), http://www.ftc.gov/bc/0558.pdf; 4 TRADE
REG. REP. (CCH), supra note 48, ¶ 13,132, § 2.1, at 20,733.
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property no different than other kinds of property, scholars and theorists
have often used the utilitarian or economic incentive framework to
justify giving exclusive rights to inventors.50 The theory is that giving
investors exclusive rights in intellectual property creates incentives to
invent that otherwise would not be there.51
The extensive debate over justification for exclusive rights in
intellectual property has raised the question whether intellectual property
laws really are about property rights or about promoting innovation. The
fact that intellectual property is considered just another kind of property
makes it difficult to argue that intellectual property laws are not about
property rights; however, commentators have vigorously argued that
intellectual property is about promoting innovation.52 In order to support
their position, those who argue that intellectual property is about
promoting innovation often point to the language of the Constitution and
requirements for obtaining intellectual property rights, arguing that they
are designed to create incentives to innovate and, ultimately, to promote
innovation.53 This position has been supported by the Supreme Court,
which made clear that in the patent context, the ultimate purpose of the
act is to promote innovation:
[The] purpose [of patent power] has two dimensions. Most obviously
the grant of exclusive rights to their respective writings and discoveries
is intended to encourage the creativity of “Authors and Inventors.”
But the requirement that those exclusive grants be for “limited Times”
serves the ultimate purpose of promoting the “Progress of Science and
useful Arts” by guaranteeing that those innovations will enter the
public domain as soon as the period of exclusivity expires.54

Furthermore, the landmark decision in Mazer v. Stein made it
piercingly clear that although patent statutes are designed to strongly
reward the owner of patents rights in order to encourage inventions,
patent statutes make reward to the owner a secondary consideration.55

See First, supra note 48 (providing an extensive background and discussion on this issue).
First, supra note 48. See also DOJ, ANTITRUST DIV., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE
ANTITRUST LAWS: PROTECTING INNOVATORS AND INNOVATION (1995) (address by Richard J.
Gilbert, Deputy Ass’t Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div. of DOJ, before the Annual Winter Meeting of the
Licensing Executives Society), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/0130.htm
(last visited Feb. 22, 2010).
52. See First, supra note 48.
53. First, supra note 48.
54. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 223 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
55. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954), superseded by statute, Copyright Act of 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976). See also, e.g., Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co.,
50.
51.
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“The copyright law, like the patent statutes, makes reward to the owner
a secondary consideration.” However, it is “intended definitely to
grant valuable, enforceable rights to authors, publishers, etc., without
burdensome requirements; ‘to afford greater encouragement to the
production of literary [or artistic] works of lasting benefit to the
world.’” The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering
Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that
encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to
advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in
“Science and useful Arts.” Sacrificial days devoted to such creative
activities deserve rewards commensurate with the services rendered.56

Clearly, the idea that the purpose of intellectual property laws is
primarily to promote innovations and secondarily to reward the property
rights owners is now deeply embedded in intellectual property law.

III. CONFLICTS BETWEEN THE PATENT SYSTEM AND ANTITRUST LAWS
Are the patent system and antitrust laws in conflict? Is there a
tension between the need to protect the rights of intellectual property
owners and the need to protect consumers? At first sight, the patent
system and antitrust laws appear to be in conflict because the patent
system gives to the owners of patent rights a right to exclude competitors
for a limited number of years, while antitrust laws protect robust
competition. However, modern thinking has dismantled the concept that
antitrust and intellectual property are in conflict, and the common view
is that the two bodies of law are complementary and are designed to
promote innovations and enhance consumer welfare.57 Ward Bowman
has offered arguably one of the most persuasive and comprehensive
499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991). See also Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429
(1984) (“The monopoly privileges . . . [are not] primarily designed to provide a special private
benefit. Rather, the limited grant . . . is intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and
inventors by the provision of a special reward . . . .”) (rejecting claim of copyright liability arising
out of the sale of VCRs), superseded by statute, Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No.
105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998).
56. Mazer, 347 U.S. at 219 (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Paramount Pictures,
334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948); Washington Co. v. Pearson, 306 U.S. 30, 36 (1939)).
57. See DOJ & FTC, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS:
PROMOTING
INNOVATION
AND
COMPETITION
2
(Apr.
2007),
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/innovation/P040101PromotingInnovationandCompetitionrpt0704.pdf.
See also SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1203 (2d Cir. 1981); DOJ & FTC, supra note
49, at 2 (“The intellectual property laws and the antitrust laws share the common purpose of
promoting innovation and enhancing consumer welfare.”).
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interpretations of the interaction between the patent system and antitrust
laws. In his book Patent and Antitrust Law: A Legal and Economic
Appraisal, Bowman argues:
In terms of the economic goals sought, the supposed opposition
between these laws is lacking. Both antitrust law and patent law have
a common central economic goal: to maximize wealth by producing
what consumers want at the lowest cost. In serving this common goal,
reconciliation between patent and antitrust law involves serious
problems of assessing effects, but not conflicting purposes. Antitrust
law does not demand competition under all circumstances. Quite
properly, it permits monopoly when monopoly makes for greater
output than would the alternative of an artificially fragmented
(inefficient) industry. The patent monopoly fits directly into this
scheme insofar as its central aim is achieved. It is designed to provide
something which consumers value and which they could not have at all
or have as abundantly were no patent protection afforded. . . .

....
The goal of both antitrust law and patent law is to maximize allocative
efficiency (making what consumers want) and productive efficiency
(making these goods with the fewest scarce resources). In achieving
this goal under either antitrust or patent law the detriment to be
avoided is output restriction. This may arise from monopolization
which diverts production from more urgent to less urgent use or from
legal rules requiring inefficient methods of production. The evil then
may be viewed as net output restriction after efficiency increases are
accounted for. Both antitrust and patent law seek output expansion not
output restriction. Competition deserves support insofar as it brings
about this result. And so it is with patents. The temporary monopoly
afforded by a patent, once a particular invention has come into being,
will have all the output-restrictive disabilities of any monopoly. The
argument for patents is that without this temporary monopoly there
would be insufficient profit incentives to produce the invention, and
that because an invention is profitable only if consumers are willing to
pay what the patentee charges, the consumers are therefore better off
than they would be without the invention, even if they are charged
“monopoly” prices. If this is so, a trade-off (some monopoly restraint
for greater output in the long run) is in the interest of socially desirable
resource allocation. An appraisal of alleged conflicts between antitrust
law and patent law depends upon understanding the role of profits in
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providing the incentive for undertaking efficient production of those
things consumers value.58

According to this approach, the two laws have the same goal and
are not in conflict at all. Rather, they are complementary efforts to
promote an efficient marketplace and long-run, dynamic competition
through innovation. The Supreme Court in Atari Games Corp. v.
Nintendo of America, Inc. has also embraced this concept: "the two
bodies of law are actually complementary, as both are aimed at
“Without
encouraging innovation, industry and competition.”59
intellectual property rights, the incentive to invest and innovate would be
greatly diminished. That result would be contrary to the very purpose of
the antitrust laws, which is to promote the well-being of consumers by
spurring efficiency, innovation, and investment.”60
Arguably, the two laws are complementary, at least in theory, and
have the same goal—to promote fair competition and to bring innovation
to consumers. Nonetheless, it is indisputable that the two laws take very
different routes to get to their goals: antitrust laws via robust
competition in the marketplace, the patent system via the right to
exclude competition for a limited number of years in order to protect the
ability to earn a return on the investments necessary to innovate.61
Although both systems spur competition among rivals and seek to
promote innovation, it is too ambitious to say that the two laws are
always complimentary and never in conflict. The conflict between the
two laws occurs when one of the laws gets out of its lane and gets in the
way of another and, consequentially, hinders competition and
innovation. Throughout recent years, the two laws were fairly active in
attempting to keep each other in the proper lane, and that has greatly
helped to reduce the conflict between the two laws.62 Nonetheless, there
are still many ongoing concerns, and the proper balance between the two
laws is yet to be found.

58. See WARD BOWMAN, JR., PATENT AND ANTITRUST LAW: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
APPRAISAL 1-3 (1973). See also Paul Goldstein, The Competitive Mandate: From Sears to Lear,
59 CALIF. L. REV. 873, 874, 878-79 (1971).
59. See, e.g., Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., 897 F.2d 1572, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
60. See DOJ, supra note 51.
61. DiscoVision Assoc. v. Disc Mfg. Inc., 42 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 1749, No. 95-345-SLR,
1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7507, at *24 (D. Del. Apr. 3, 1997).
62. Tremendous progress has been made in attempting to reduce the conflict between the two
laws, primarily in post-grant issues, that is, what can you do with the patent once you get it. See,
e.g., id. Also, antitrust authorities issued Intellectual Property Guidelines in 1995. See ANTITRUST
GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 49.
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To begin with, the general sentiment is that patent rights are getting
overprotected, while the standards to grant patents are lowering.63
Consequently, commentators argue that this expansion of patent rights
not only makes protecting the property rights of inventors a primary
consideration, but it also stagnates innovation, which ought to be the
primary consideration of intellectual property laws.64 As put by Harvard
professor John Lerner during his testimony before a House
subcommittee:
We've moved toward this litigious point over the past two decades as
the courts strengthened the rights of patent holders while the standards
to grant patents were weakened. It's a ‘perfect storm,’ a complex and
intensifying combination of factors that increasingly makes the patent
system a hindrance rather than a spur to innovation.65

Scholars also argue that overly expansive patent protection and
overly excessive patents weaken innovation by unnecessarily shrinking
the public domain and deterring innovative activity by others.66 Overall,
the general consensus is that protection of intellectual property in
general, and patents in particular, is totally out of control.67
Furthermore, there are widespread and growing concerns about the
patent application process. The notion is that the PTO issues far too
many “questionable” patents that are unlikely to be found valid based on
a thorough review of the sort one sees in patent litigation. As Shapiro
and Lemley have pointed out:

63. See Chabrow, supra note 10.
64. See, e.g., Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, supra note 48, at
1058-59. Lemley was writing only with respect to over breadth, but his reasoning applies to loose
patentability standards, as well. See also First, supra note 48.
65. See Chabrow, supra note 10.
66. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION 249
(2005). See also Christopher R. Leslie, Antitrust and Patent Law as Component Parts of Innovation
Policy, 34 IOWA J. CORP. L. 1259 (2009). The business method patents are particularly
controversial. For example, a patent has been issued for “Methods of Promoting Sleep Systems,”
which covers a “method for selecting a sleep system” by “positioning a person on a mattress in a
lying position,” extending one of their arms, positioning a pillow “underneath the person’s head,”
and then forcefully moving the arm towards the person’s feet. As explained in the patent:
Finding the correct mattress can be a difficult task. Within the United States there are
literally hundreds of makes and models of mattresses, such as firm mattress[es], plush
mattresses, and the like. Selecting a mattress that will provide an appropriate degree of
comfort and/or support to meet a person’s needs can be especially challenging.
See U.S. Patent No. 6,997,070 (issued Feb. 14, 2006) (abstract) (example available at
http://www.patentlysilly.com/patent.php?patID=6997070) (last visited Jan. 18, 2010).
67. See First, supra note 48.
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There are good reasons to doubt the efficiency of a system for granting
patents under which 1) patents differ greatly in their commercial
significance and value; 2) patent applicants are uncertain about the
value of their ideas, but have far superior information to examiners; 3)
patent applicants often have superior information as well about prior
art, but are under no obligation to conduct a search for the relevant
prior art; 4) patent applicants can persist repeatedly through the
continuation process in seeking to have certain claims accepted by
patent examiners; 5) the burden of proof falls upon the PTO to explain
why a patent application will not be granted; and 6) patent examiners
are faced with a flood of applications and have little time to devote to
each one.68

The inefficiencies of the patent application process coupled with
overprotection and expansion of patent rights have contributed to
another problem: the skyrocketing number of issued patents.69 At first it
might seem that the skyrocketing number of issued patents is not
necessarily something to be worried about. After all, more patents mean
more innovations right? Ideally yes, but in reality that is not the case
because a large amount of patents have a little or no value.70 On the
other hand, the skyrocketing number of issued patents can also have very
negative effects on competition and innovation. Commentators point out
that the patent explosion could injure competition and impede
innovation by making it more difficult for rival inventors to sell
competing products. According to Professor Carl Shapiro, a “patent
thicket” has formed, which he describes as “a dense web of overlapping
intellectual property rights that a company must hack its way through in
order to actually commercialize new technology.”71 Firms in certain
industries are said to fear that it is “all too easy” to infringe another
patent accidentally and thereby risk liability.72 The testimony of an
executive from Texas Instruments illustrates why: “TI has something
like 8000 patents in the United States that are active patents, and for us
to know what's in that portfolio, we think, is just a mind-boggling,
68. Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 75, 83
(2005), available at http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/shapiro/patents.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2010).
69. See USPTO ANNUAL REPORT: PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT FISCAL
YEAR 2009, supra note 3.
70. Jean O. Lanjouw, Ariel Pakes & Jonathan Putnam, How to Count Patents and Value
Intellectual Property: The Uses of Patent Renewal and Application Data, 46 J. INDUS. ECON. 405
(1998). See also Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 68, at 75, 81.
71. See Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and
Standard-Setting, in INNOV. POL’Y & ECON. 119, 120 (Adam Jaffe et al. eds., 2001).
72. Id. at 121.
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budget-busting exercise to try to figure that out with any degree of
accuracy at all.”73 If a company with the resources of Texas Instruments
cannot afford to know even what it has in its own patent portfolio, one
can imagine how hard it could be for small potential entrants to
determine their risks of triggering a patent infringement lawsuit.
Due to the current state of the patent system, commentators keep
debating over what can be done to improve the current state of the patent
system. The debate generally centers around well-worn discussions over
how to strike an optimal level of patent protection and how to improve
the patent applications process.74 These debates are not new. For
example, President Johnson established a Commission on the Patent
System in 1965 “To Promote the Progress of . . . Useful Arts” that made
thirty-five recommendations on how to improve the patent system, and
the majority of concerns were almost identical to current ones.75 As
evinced by the statement of President Johnson upon releasing the report
of the President's Commission on the Patent System, even the rhetoric
was almost identical to current debates, and his statement was made
forty-five years ago.76 Through the years, a number of scholars and
policymakers have continued proposing meaningful reforms designed to
limit the scope of patent protection and to improve the patent application
process in order to reduce the number of improperly issued patents
without causing genuine innovators to be denied patents.77 Some of

73.

FTC, TRANSCRIPT OF COMPETITION AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY
KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY WORKSHOP 743 (Feb. 28, 2002) (testimony of Frederick
Telecky, Senior Vice President and Gen. Patent Counsel, Texas Instruments, Inc. as of date of
workshop), www.ftc.gov/opp/intellect/020228ftc.pdf.
74. See generally DOJ & FTC, supra note 2; DOJ, supra note 2; FTC, supra note 2; GILBERT,
supra note 2.
75. COMM’N ON THE PATENT SYS., “TO PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF . . . USEFUL ARTS”: IN
AN AGE OF EXPLODING TECHNOLOGY: REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON THE PATENT
SYSTEM (1966).
76. See John T. Woolley & Gerhard Peters, Lyndon B. Johnson: Statement by the President
upon Releasing the Report of the President's Commission on the Patent System, THE AMERICAN
PRESIDENCY PROJECT (statement of then President Lyndon B. Johnson, Dec. 2, 1966),
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=28057 (last visited Feb. 23, 2010).
77. Some of the suggestions include the need to improve patent quality, arguing that the
patent applications should be subjected to more rigorous scrutiny at patent offices to make certain
that they meet the statutory standards for patentability and patent scope. Particular suggestions
include raising the budgets of patent offices so that they can hire more examiners, taking advantage
of the knowledge that companies and private researchers have by giving them more opportunities to
initiate post-grant challenges. Another common proposal is to establish a more effective opposition
system in which interested third parties could challenge the validity of an issued patent before an
administrative patent board. See FTC, supra note 2. See also 2000 United States Patent and
IN THE
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these proposals have been adopted.
For example, the seventh
recommendation of President Johnson’s commission called for pre-issue
publication, which was finally adopted in 1999.78 Nonetheless, in spite
of tremendous efforts to improve the patent system, the already alarming
situation has only gotten worse.
While there might be many explanations why the patent system is
not functional, one might be particularly worth considering. Empirical
studies have cast doubt on innovation as the main reason for patenting,
and it is now known that more and more companies are using intellectual
property in general and patents in particular as a strategic tool.79 Studies
indicate that most firms rely on patents the least among a variety of
methods for protecting the returns from their inventions and that in no
industry are patents identified as the most effective appropriability
mechanism.80 Realizing this fact, scholars were curious why more and
more patents are being sought if they are not helping most firms to
protect their innovation returns. It is now known that firms seek patents
under many circumstances, and not only when they wish to protect a
newly developed technology from imitation and exploit it
commercially.81 For example, “start-up companies may try to get as
many patents as possible because patents can help to persuade venture
capitalists to fund young firms.”82 “Many large companies may want to
build up their patent portfolios for the purpose of gaining leverage in
licensing or settlement negotiations.”83 Some companies may use the
“patent flooding” 84 strategy to anticompetitively disadvantage rivals by
raising their cost.85 Alternatively, companies may pursue patents in an

Trademark Office: Hearing on H.R. 63-845 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Prop.
of the H.R. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 9.
78. 35 U.S.C. § 122 (2010).
79. COHEN ET AL., supra note 4, at 8.
80. Id. at 3.
81. Id. at 7, 14.
82. See OECD, POLICY ROUNDTABLES: COMPETITION, PATENTS AND INNOVATION,
DAF/COMP (2007) 40, at 28 (Jan. 8, 2008) (from background note: Box 1. The Problem of
Measuring Innovation), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/26/10/39888509.pdf.
83. Id.
84. With patent flooding, a firm files a multitude of patent applications that claim minor
variations on a competitor’s existing technology. Sri Krishna Sankaran, Patent Flooding in the
United States and Japan, 40 IDEA J. L. & TECH. 393 (2000).
85. Id. See also COHEN ET AL., supra note 4, at 4. As the name implies, a raising rivals’
costs strategy generally involves actions by one firm to increase the costs of one or more
competitors in order to gain an advantage in the marketplace. The advantage of strategies that raise
rivals’ costs over other strategies of unilateral monopolization (such as predatory pricing) is that
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effort to block their competitors’ development activities.86 Some
websites that provide general information on patents specifically advise
others to “use patents to block competitors,” while some provide “ask
yourself such questions as: . . . What patents do we need to block our
competitors now and in the future?”87 Toyota, for example, has filed for
patents on more than 2,000 systems and components for its best-selling
hybrid Prius in order to cash in on the Obama administration’s tough
new fuel-efficiency standards.88 It was suggested Toyota’s goal is to
make it difficult for other auto-makers to develop their own hybrids
without seeking licensing from Toyota. Both the Ford Motor Company
and Nissan Motor Company have already done so in order to make their
hybrid vehicles.89
Unlike expansion and broadening of patents rights and
inefficiencies of the PTO office, the known fact that patentees widely
rely on patents for reasons other than protecting a newly developed
technology from imitation and exploiting it commercially has not
received as much attention as it should have. If the patent system was
not so broken, paying close attention to why patentees rely on patents
would not be necessary or justified. However, given that it is fairly easy
to obtain a patent, including “questionable” or invalid ones due to the
above-stated reasons, and given that it is accepted that most patents have
little or no commercial potential/value and the Supreme Court has held
that the patentee does not even have a duty to use the granted patent, a
patentee can easily obtain a patent and rely on it solely to hurt
competitors.90 When the Framers authorized Congress “To promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
such strategies may require little or no short-run profit sacrifice to achieve the desired long-term
goal of lessening competition in the marketplace. Id.
86. OECD, supra note 82, at 28.
87. See CASTLE ISLAND CO., Benefits of Having an IP Strategy: Competitive Intelligence,
USING PATENTS AS KEY INFORMATION SOURCES FOR COMPETITIVE INTELLIGENCE AND BUSINESS
STRATEGY (last modified Oct. 18, 2008), available at http://www.additive3d.com/patk_03.htm (last
visited Oct. 10, 2010). See also Taking Intellectual Property Seriously, CHIEFEXECUTIVE.NET
(Nov.
1,
2004),
available
at
http://www.chiefexecutive.net/ME2/dirmod.asp?sid=&nm=&type=Publishing&mod=Publications%
3A%3AArticle&mid=8F3A7027421841978F18BE895F87F791&tier=4&id=055DF3168CC44ABC
B5B7760EBE66C033 (last visited Feb. 23, 2010).
88. See John Murphy, Toyota Builds Thicket of Patents Around Hybrid To Block
Competitors,
WALL
ST.
J.,
July
1,
2009,
at
B1,
available
at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124640553503576637.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2010).
89. Id.
90. See Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 429 (1908).
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and Discoveries,” the obvious intention was to create incentives to
innovate by enabling inventors to exploit their invention commercially
by not allowing free-riding and unjust imitation from competitors. It
was not a constitutional intention to enable patentees to use the patent
system as an incentive to deliberately hurt competitors by purposely
blocking their development or raising their cost, without any
concomitant advance in the “Progress of Science and useful Arts.”
Unfortunately, it appears that is what the patent system is turning into,
which clearly creates a conflict with antitrust laws and is extremely
detrimental to innovation for numerous reasons. For example, such a
massive reliance on patents for “illegitimate reasons” inherently
increases the number of issued patents, which, as described above, has
proven to have negative effects on competition and innovation in and of
itself. Needless to say, the time and money spent on developing and
filing for these “illegitimate” patents designed to hurt competitions could
have been better spent on developing new and genuine inventions
capable of promoting “Progress of Science and useful Arts.”
One might argue that finding an optimal level of patent protection
and enhancing the efficiency of the patent application process will
preclude patentees from relying on patents for “illegitimate” reasons, but
that is unlikely to be the case. As some commentators have correctly
suggested “patents are either too weak or too strong.”91 The U.S. has
traditionally favored strong protection of intellectual property rights and,
given that intellectual property is proudly considered a key driver of the
U.S. economy, the process is unlikely to change to a degree that will
make it impossible for patentees to rely on patents for improper
reasons.92 Along the same lines, the patent application process will
never be as efficient as it would need to be to preclude patentees from
relying on patents for improper purposes. As explained by Professor
Dreyfuss in her testimony before a House subcommittee:
[s]ome bad patents always have issued and always will issue.
Examiners are human; the information needed to properly assess
patentability is not always available to them. And to be candid, not
every invention has the kind of commercial potential that merits the

Ghosh, supra note 8.
See DOJ, PREPARED REMARKS OF ATTORNEY GENERAL ALBERTO R. GONZALES AT THE
UNITED STATES CHAMBER OF COMMERCE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SUMMIT (2006), available at
http://www.justice.gov/archive/ag/speeches/2006/ag_speech_0609291.html (last visited Oct. 10,
2010).
91.
92.
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expenditure of vast resources and improper patents will always be
issued.93

The following section of the article will explore alternative
opportunities capable of precluding reliance on patents for solely
“illegitimate” reasons and leading to a proper balance between the patent
system and antitrust laws.
IV. PROPOSED ADJUSTMENTS
A.

Pre-Grant: Competition Policy with a Focus on Antitrust Intent
Must Be Considered in an Initial Patent Application and the
Applicant’s Interview with the PTO.

In a fairly recent patent case, DiscoVision Associates v. Disc
Manufacturing Inc., a district court held that a firm’s right to even file
patent applications was qualified, “subject to abuse and antitrust
scrutiny.”94 However, under the current patent system, issues related to
a patentee’s subjective intent for patenting do not come up in patent
applications, or during the applicant’s interview with the PTO, as the
PTO is only interested in whether the patent application meets all
statutory standards for patentability.95 The competition policy is not
considered in the initial review of patent applications. This paper argues
that it should be. This is not to suggest that antitrust authorities should
be involved in initial review of patent applications. For several reasons,
such as a lack of relevant technical expertise and limited resources, it has
been suggested that competition authorities should not assume
responsibilities related to the initial review of patent applications, but
should assist the PTO in improving the patent granting process through
informal cooperation designed to foster greater mutual understanding of
each other’s fields.96
93. See 2000 United States Patent and Trademark Office: Hearing on H.R. 63-845 Before
the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Prop. of the H.R. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 9, at
112.
94. DiscoVision Assoc. v. Disc Mfg. Inc., 42 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 1749, No. 95-345-SLR,
1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7507, at *24 (D. Del. Apr. 3, 1997).
95. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2010).
96. See OECD, POLICY ROUNDTABLES: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, DAF/COMP
(2004) 24, at 7 (Jan. 21, 2005) (executive summary by the Secretariat of the OECD),
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/61/48/34306055.pdf. Instead, commentators have suggested a
variety of ways for competition authorities to assist IP agencies in taking steps to improve the IP
granting process themselves. The ideas included opening interdisciplinary dialogues with patent
agencies to foster greater mutual understanding of each other’s fields, commissioning expert reports
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However, while it would not be practicable for competition
authorities to participate in the initial review of patent applications for
the reasons states above, there is no valid reason why competition policy
should not be considered in the initial review of patent applications,
given that at least one court has held that firm’s right to even file patent
applications is qualified, “subject to abuse and antitrust scrutiny,”97 and
the notion that “reconciling intellectual property and competition policy
requires recognizing that intellectual property law is a form of
competition policy.”98 I am not proposing that the PTO consider the
potential effect on the market before granting the patent. Such inquiry
would be overly time consuming, expansive, and speculative. However,
the PTO should make an inquiry into the patentee’s motives for
patenting in order to evaluate whether the patentee has an
anticompetitive intent.
Obtaining a patent is a qualified privilege fairly analogous to
obtaining a visa to enter the United States. In both instances, a qualified
privilege is granted for a certain period of time only if an applicant
meets all statutory requirements to obtain a privilege and, subsequently,
it must act strictly within the bounds of its statutory rights to maintain
the privilege.99 For years, one of the most pressing issues in the
immigration law was using temporary visitors’ visas, such as a B-2
tourist visa or an F-1 student visa, to permanently immigrate to the
United States. Consequently, appropriate legislation was enacted, and
the visa applicant’s intent is now an important part of visa application
process for most temporary visas.100 The consular or port officials are

that study a country’s patenting system to determine whether and how it is causing any undue
problems, and holding seminars or hearings in which academics, public and private sector
practitioners, and industry participants come together to discuss problems and possible
improvements to IP policies. Id. Some scholars have joined in the call for competition and patent
officials to meet regularly to share information and views about whether patents are having
desirable effects and how matters might be improved by easing or tightening patent examination
policies and processes. See generally James Langenfeld, Intellectual Property and Antitrust: Steps
Toward Striking a Balance, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 91 (2001).
97. See generally DiscoVision Assoc., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7507, at *24.
98. Ghosh, supra note 8, at 345.
99. See, e.g., BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, Foreign Students (F-1)
in Public Schools, TRAVEL.STATE.GOV, http://travel.state.gov/visa/temp/types/types_1269.html
(last visited Feb. 25, 2010). See also Patent Act of 1952, ch. 10, 66 Stat. 792, 797-98 (1952)
(codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 100-04 (2010)); BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T
OF
STATE,
Visa
Denials,
TRAVEL.STATE.GOV,
available
at
http://travel.state.gov/visa/frvi/denials/denials_1361.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2010).
100. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 214(b), 104 Stat.
4978 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1184(b) (2006)).The Immigration and Nationality Act, or
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required to assess whether a visa applicant has impermissible immigrant
intent, and if they develop a “reasonable belief” that a visa applicant has
such intent, the visa applicant can be denied admission to the United
States.101 The courts have clarified the concept of dual intent and
immigration intent, as a whole line of immigration law cases have made
a distinction between “fixed” immigrant intent, which is prohibited, with
a mere desire to permanently stay in the United States if possible, which
Similar standards and inquiry should be
is not prohibited.102
implemented in the patent system, as the patent system is currently
facing a similar conceptual problem: patentees are using the patent
system for unintended purposes. This is not to suggest that the patent
applicant should be denied what appears to be a perfectly valid patent if
there are some concerns as to why the patent is sought. However, if the
patent officer develops a “reasonable belief” that a patentee is seeking a
patent for reasons other than protecting a newly developed invention and
has a “fixed” antitrust intent, not merely a desire to hurt competitors if
possible, such patent application should be very closely scrutinized, and
more information should be requested from the applicant.

INA, was originally created in 1952. Before the INA, a variety of statutes governed immigration
law but were not organized in one location. The McCarran-Walter Bill of 1952, Public Law No. 82414, collected and codified many existing provisions and reorganized the structure of immigration
law. The Act has been amended many times over the years, but is still the basic body of
immigration law. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC [DHS], Immigration and Nationality Act, U.S.
CITIZENSHIP
AND
IMMIGRATION
SERVICES,
available
at
http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543f6d1a/?vgnextcha
nnel=f3829c7755cb9010VgnVCM10000045f3d6a1RCRD&vgnextoid=f3829c7755cb9010VgnVC
M10000045f3d6a1RCRD (last visited Oct. 11, 2010). See also DHS, TEMPORARY MIGRATION TO
THE UNITED STATES: NONIMMIGRANT ADMISSIONS UNDER U.S. IMMIGRATION LAW 75-76 (Jan.
2006), available at http://www.uscis.gov/files/nativedocuments/Nonimmigrants_2006.pdf (last
visited Feb. 27, 2010).
101. See BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, Visa Denials, supra note 99
(explaining INA § 214(b)).
102. After the INA was first enacted in 1952, courts have developed the concept of
immigration intent. See Bong Youn Choy v. Barber, 279 F.2d 642, 645-46 (9th Cir. 1960) (finding
even though an alien wanted to finish his and his children's education in America, he only intended
to stay temporarily as a visitor unless he could arrange a permanent legal stay). See also Brownell
v. Carija, 254 F.2d 78, 80 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (finding nonimmigrant who entered for travel through
the United States “does not become an unlawful entrant because he entertains a desire, purpose or
intent to remain here if the laws of the country permit him to do so. Such a purpose, so limited,
could at best be only a hope”); Chryssikos v. Comm. of Immigration, 3 F.2d 372, 375 (2d Cir. 1924)
(finding that when a new bride entered the United States on a visitor’s visa with her permanent
resident husband, she intended to depart when her visa expired, and to return only after her husband
became a citizen). In the case Lauvik v. INS, 910 F.2d 658, 660, 662 (9th Cir. 1990), the judge
reversed the denial of an E-2 for an applicant who expressed the desire to immigrate but did not
intend to immigrate if not permitted.
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While one might argue that it might be nearly impossible to find
such antitrust intent, it is hard to imagine that it would be any harder
than finding an intent to form an agreement to fix prices or divide the
territory in antitrust law, finding immigrant intent in visa applicants, or
finding discriminatory intent against a protected class in constitutional
law. In addition to straight forward questioning of an applicant, there
are varieties of factors that an examiner can consider in finding antitrust
intent. To begin with, because it is known that the reliance on patents
significantly varies from industry to industry,103 the examiner can
consider whether the patent is sought in an industry where patents are
not commonly used and whether the applicant’s legitimate purposes
could have been served by alternative means. Such inquiries are not
foreign to courts.104 Furthermore, the examiner can consider whether the
patentee already has other patents in the same field concerning the same
or a substantially similar invention. If so, the examiner can inquire into
the apparent commercial value of such patents and how/if the patentee
used those other patents. Considering competition policy with the focus
on antitrust intent in initial review of patent applications will inherently
put the patent applicants on notice that relying on patents for primarily
anticompetitive reasons will not be tolerated. While the patent applicants
may still try to “abuse” the patent system, the patent applicants will have
to do much more in order to do so. Informal cooperation with antitrust
authorities designed to foster greater mutual understanding of each
other’s fields would be particularly helpful to patent officers in the
context of antitrust intent, as antitrust authorities have tremendous
experience with finding impermissible antitrust intent.
B.

Post-Grant: Intent Standards Must Be More Objective Across the
Board and Antitrust Must Play a More Meaningful Role.

One reason that enables patentees to rely on patents for
“illegitimate” reasons is the current state of law on the role of subjective
intent in patents. The role of subjective intent in patents has been
debated in years past, and it has been on the table in many cases.105 The

103. See COHEN ET AL., supra note 4, at 4.
104. In United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 391 U.S. 244 (1968), the court questioned
United Shoe’s acquisitions of patents, which suggests legitimate purposes could have been served
by alternative means.
105. For example, in United Shoe, the court questioned United Shoe’s acquisitions of patents,
suggesting legitimate purposes could have been served by alternative means. Id. Similarly, in
Kobe, Inc. v. Dempsey Pump Co., 198 F.2d 416, 423-24, 430 (10th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344
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prevailing view on the role of subjective intent in patents has been
articulated in Independent Service Organizations Antitrust Litigation
(Xerox)106 where the court made it clear that in the absence of any illegal
tying, fraud on the PTO, or sham litigation, the patentee’s subjective
intent for obtaining a patent or enforcing its statutory rights is largely
irrelevant.107 The court’s approach in Xerox appears sound as far as it
goes. If the patent holder has a valid patent and does not engage in
“illegal acts,” inquiry into patentee’s subjective intent for enforcing its
statutory rights is neither necessary nor justified. To hold otherwise
would inherently weaken the patent system. Nevertheless, the issue of
subjective intent in patents is far from settled. That is so because intent
standards to find those “illegal acts,” fraud for example, that would then
justify inquiry into the patentee’s subjective intent are set too high and
are highly subjective. The fairly recent decision in Dippin’ Dots,108 after
In re Bilski109 arguably the second most controversial patent case in
recent history, is a good example of inadequacy and inefficiency of
intent standards in patent law that inherently increase expected costs
from legal errors.
The Dippin’ Dots case arose out of a patent dispute between
Dippin’ Dots and its former distributors.110 Dippin’ Dots was the holder
of a patent covering a method for making a form of cryogenically

U.S. 837 (1952), the Court found that the acquisition, non-use, and enforcement of “every important
patent” in the field with a purpose to exclude competition, together with other anticompetitive acts,
violated section 2 of the Sherman Act. More recently, in DiscoVision, a district court has held that a
firm’s right to even file patent applications was qualified, “subject to abuse and antitrust scrutiny” if
the firm sought “to expand the monopoly granted by the patent laws by misuse, agreement, or
accumulation.” DiscoVision Assoc. v. Disc Mfg. Inc., 42 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 1749, No. 95-345SLR, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7507, at *24-26 (D. Del. Apr. 3, 1997).
106. In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig. (Xerox), 203 F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
107. Id. It is important to note that Xerox case was decided three years after Image Technical
Services v. Eastman Kodak Co. (Kodak), 125 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 1997) reached an opposite
decision. At issue in Kodak was refusal to license patented works. The court ruled that absent a
legitimate “business justification,” unilateral conduct by the owner of intellectual property,
including a refusal to sell or license, may violate the antitrust laws if it adversely affects
competition. The Court found that Kodak’s subjective intent to exclude competition from
independent service organizations was the real reason for Kodak’s conduct and, thus, Kodak’s
“business justification” disappeared. Id. It is important to note that Kodak has not been followed by
other courts and commentators have widely criticized it, although some commentators have
endorsed this decision. Xerox, 203 F.3d at 1326-27.
108. Dippin’ Dots, Inc. v. Mosey, 476 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
109. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
110. Dippin’ Dots, 476 F.3d at 1341.
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prepared beaded novelty ice cream products.111 When several of Dippin’
Dots’ former distributors terminated their relationship with Dippin’ Dots
in order to compete against it, Dippin’ Dots initiated a series of patent
infringement lawsuits against its new competitors.112 The distributors
defended on the grounds of inequitable conduct and a Walker Process
counterclaim under section 2 of the Sherman Act based on undisputed
facts relating to omission of information from the patent application
regarding certain prior sales from the patent at issue that would render
the patent invalid.113 In particular, Dippin’ Dots included a sworn
statement in its patent application claiming that “the initial sales were in
March of 1988,” while it was undisputed that sales were made in 1987;
the 1987 sales were not disclosed by Dippin’ Dots in its application to
the PTO.114 Under the Patent Act, sales made more than one year before
the patent priority date trigger the on-sale bar.115
The doctrine of inequitable conduct and the Walker Process
claim essentially operate as defenses in patent infringement lawsuits.
The judicially created doctrine of inequitable conduct is the patent
system’s response to invalid patents procured by deceptive conduct
before the PTO.116 The Walker Process claim is its antitrust equivalent
based on the Supreme Court’s holding that a claim under section 2 of the
Sherman Act could be maintained against the holder of a patent who
obtained that patent through fraud on the Patent Office, assuming all
other elements of a section 2 monopolization claim are met.117 While
both defenses require a showing that the patent holder intentionally
misrepresented or failed to disclose material information to the PTO, the
primary distinction between the affirmative defense of inequitable
conduct and a claim for Walker Process fraud is the heightened standard
for materiality and intent for the latter.118 However, while the
inequitable conduct defense merely denies the enforcement of a patent
111. Id. at 1340. Specifically, the patented method was for preparing, storing and serving a
free flowing, frozen alimentary dairy product comprising six separate steps. Id.
112. Id. at 1341.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1340-41.
115. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).
116. Digital Control, Inc. v. Charles Mach. Works, 437 F.3d 1309, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
117. See Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965).
The United States Supreme Court held that a claim under section 2 of the Sherman Act could be
maintained against the holder of a patent who obtained that patent through fraud on the Patent
Office, assuming all other elements of a section 2 monopolization claim are met. Id. at 177.
118. Dippin’ Dots, 476 F.3d at 1346 (citing Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc.,
141 F.3d 1059, 1069 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
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that was procured by unclean hands, a successful Walker Process claim
denies the enforcement of a patent procured by unclean hands and
subjects the patentee to antitrust liability, including treble damages.119
Therefore, although the difference between inequitable conduct and
Walker Process fraud claims seems merely technical, and the two claims
very often arise in the same matter and are supported by the same
evidence, the practical difference between the two claims is tremendous.
The jury in Dippin’ Dots found for distributors and upheld both the
inequitable conduct defense and Walker Process counterclaim.120 On
appeal, the Federal Court also upheld distributors inequitable conduct
defense.121 The court first found that omission of prior sales was
material because the PTO would not have issued the patent if the 1987
festival sales had been disclosed.122 The court then turned to the
question of intent and found that although the evidence of Dippin’ Dots’
intent to deceive the examiner was “not particularly strong,” the court
was allowed “to balance the relatively weak evidence of intent together
with the strong evidence that [Dippin’ Dots’] omission was highly
material to the issuance of the ‘156 patent and to find that on balance,
inequitable conduct had occurred.’”123 However, the court did not
uphold the Walker Process counterclaim.124 The court did find that
omission of the 1987 festival sales met the heightened standard of
materiality for Walker Process claim.125 Nonetheless, the court found
that omission of the festival sales, which was sufficient to prove intent
for purposes of inequitable conduct, was not sufficient to prove the
heightened standard of deceptive intent for Walker Process fraud.126
The court refused to balance the high materiality of omission against the
lesser showing of deceptive intent, as it did to find inequitable

119. Walker Process, 382 U.S. at 175, 176-77; 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000) (“[T]he court may
increase the damages up to three times the amount found or assessed.”); 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2000)
(“The court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.”).
120. Dippin’ Dots, 476 F.3d at 1342 (“The jury also found that both Jones and Schickli had,
with intent to deceive, made material misrepresentations or omissions in violation of the duty of
candor to the PTO. It also determined that defendants Mini Melts, Inc. and Frosty Bites
Distribution had proven all required elements of their antitrust counterclaim, including the requisite
fraud on the PTO.”).
121. Id. at 1346.
122. Id. at 1347.
123. Id. at 1346.
124. Id. at 1348.
125. Id. at 1347.
126. Id. at 1348.
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conduct.127 The court viewed the Walker Process claim as a “sword”
and inequitable conduct as a mere “shield” and held that in order to use a
“sword” Walker Process claimants had to prove intent to deceive the
examiner independently.128 Nevertheless, the court held that omissions
can form a basis for a Walker Process claim but, again, claimants had to
affirmatively show separate actual evidence of Dippin’ Dots’ fraudulent
intent.129 The court cited Nobelpharma case as a sole example of the
kind of facts necessary to prove Walker Process fraud by omission.130
In Nobelpharma, the patent applicant had included a prior art
reference in a draft, but then deleted that reference from its final
application.131 The evidence of the actual deletion of the prior art
reference by the applicant’s patent agent was sufficient grounds for the
jury to find intent to defraud.132
Scholars were quick to criticize Dippin’ Dots on the basis that it
both goes too far and it does not go far enough. Those who claim that it
goes too far point out that it unjustifiably expands inequitable conduct
doctrine by allowing interference of deceptive intent without any
evidential support.133 Those who claim that it does not go far enough
argue that it precludes meaningful role of antitrust in the patent
system.134 On one hand, Dippin’ Dots does suggest that omission of
highly material facts will lead to an inference of deceptive intent
sufficient to prove inequitable conduct, even if the omission is purely
innocent and in good faith.135 On the other hand, Dippin’ Dots also
suggests that omissions, however material, cannot lead to an inference of
deceptive intent sufficient to prove Walker Process fraud, even if
omission is intentional and in bad faith.136 Regardless of which position
is more plausible, one fact is certain: both positions clearly indicate that
there is a probability of error that a purely innocent actor can be found
“guilty” of wrongdoing and a wrongdoer can escape a meaningful
punishment. The cost of error can be tremendous. That is so because
127. Id.
128. Id. (citing Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1071 (Fed. Cir.
1998)).
129. Dippin’ Dots, 476 F.3d at 1348.
130. Id.
131. Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 1062.
132. Id. at 1072.
133. See generally Melissa Feeney Wasserman, Limiting the Inequitable Conduct Defense, 13
VA. J.L. & TECH. 7 (2008).
134. Leslie, supra note 66.
135. Dippin’ Dots, 476 F.3d at 1346.
136. Id.
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the error can lead to overdeterrence costs if it causes potential patentees
to go way beyond the feasible level of precaution in order to avoid
potential penalties for material omissions. At the same time, the error
can also lead to underdeterrence costs if patentees discount the
likelihood of ever being subjected to rigorous antitrust liability for even
intentional omissions due to the fact that a “sword” provided by the
Walker Process claim will not be available to alleged infringers.137 As
some have suggested, if the only punishment for intentional omission is
to merely “return” the patent, that is unlikely to deter future intentional
omissions, just as if the only punishment for robbing the bank would be
to require a robber to return the money, that would unlikely deter future
robberies.138 Consequently, the patentees will not be discouraged to rely
on patents for “improper reasons,” which can ultimately lead to an even
higher number of valid and invalid patents that inherently hurt
competition and stifle innovation.
This highly controversial case clearly illustrates the inadequacy and
inefficiency of intent standards in patents. It is precisely the type of
approach to intent that was rejected by Cass and Hylton in their
extensive and widely-cited study on the role of intent analysis in
antitrust law, but they have specifically acknowledged that their
framework applies to other areas of law as well.139 Cass and Hylton
rejected the two extreme normative positions on the role of intent: the
view that intent should play no role in legal analysis, and the view that
intent should be determined for most purposes by a subjective inquiry.140
The court in Dippin’ Dots, however, seemed to follow these two extreme
normative positions. On one hand, intent played no role in finding of
inequitable conduct as the court focused solely on the high materiality of
omitted fact without any regard to intent to deceive.141 On the other
hand, the court sought highly subjective evidence of the patentee’s state
of mind, such as the evidence in Nobelpharma, to find Walker Process
claim and subject the patentee to antitrust damages.142 Cass and Hylton
rejected the two normative positions and argued in favor of a more

137. There are also administrative or litigation costs as alleged infringers will likely seek a
“shield” provided by inequitable conduct defense in virtually every case involving omissions. See
Wasserman, supra note 133.
138. Christopher R. Leslie, The Anticompetitive Effects of Unenforced Invalid Patents, 91
MINN. L. REV. 101, 173 (2006).
139. Ronald A. Cass & Keith N. Hylton, Antitrust Intent, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 657, 658 (2000).
140. Id.
141. Dippin’ Dots, 476 F.3d at 1346.
142. Id.
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objective approach to intent finding that objective approach to intent
ultimately leads to minimizing the expected costs from legal errors.143
In particular, they have argued that an “objective specific intent” should
be the proper intent standard in antitrust and other areas of law.144 Their
definition of “objective specific intent” provides in part:
[T]he term specific intent is not synonymous with subjective intent,
although the two are frequently used as synonyms both in antitrust law
and in other fields. A “subjective intent” standard requires the plaintiff
to produce evidence of the defendant’s actual state of mind. In
contrast, we use specific intent here to describe an inquiry conducted
on the basis of objective evidence. Rather than asking for direct
evidence of what the defendant had in mind, the objective approach
asks what state of mind can reasonably be attributed to the defendant
in light of his actions.145

Such an objective approach to intent would be particularly useful in
patents because it would allow courts to consider a variety of available
“external” factors to determine what state of mind could reasonably be
attributed to the defendant in light of his actions. These “external”
factors, such as the type of industry,146 the commercial potential/value of
the patent, and the patentees’ conduct in relation to the use or non-use of
the patent, could help courts to inquire into the patentee’s motives for
patenting. In turn could explain the patentee’s state of mind by
suggesting, for example, a lack of mistake or knowledge in omissions
and misrepresentations that would otherwise negate intent to deceive, as
was the case in Dippin’ Dots. Consequently, that would open the door
for a more meaningful role of antitrust in post-grant issues and enable it
to confidently swing its “swords” in the right direction without a fear of
causing innocent “casualties.” All together, by adopting a more
objective approach to intent in patents across the board, the courts would
be better positioned to minimize the cost from legal errors, to deter
future misconducts and, ultimately, to start putting an end to reliance on
patents for solely “illegitimate” reasons without causing genuine
innovators undue hardship.

143.
144.
145.
146.
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Id. at 659.
Id. (emphasis added).
See COHEN ET AL., supra note 4, at 4.
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V. CONCLUSION
The notion that the patent system and antitrust laws are in conflict
has long been dismantled as it is now accepted that the two laws
ultimately have the same goals: promoting innovations and enhancing
consumer welfare. Nonetheless, the proper balance between the two
laws is far from being found. As this article has illustrated, the patent
system is currently more of an obstacle to innovation and competition
than their promulgator. It is not only in crisis, it is so broken that it
practically enables patentees to rely on patents for solely anticompetitive
reasons without any concomitant advance in the “Progress of Science
and useful Arts,” and studies show that patentees are not reluctant to do
so.147 The broken patent system cannot be fixed with chewing gum and
duct tape. Any meaningful attempt to improve the current state of the
patent system will have to recognize an overlooked fact that patentees
seek patents under many circumstances, rather than only when they wish
to protect a newly developed technology from imitation and exploit it
commercially. This article has argued in favor of a more extensive
inquiry into the patentee’s subjective intent for patenting, which is fairly
limited under the current law in both pre-grant and post grant issues. In
particular, this article has suggested that the competition policy with a
focus on antitrust intent should be considered in the initial review of
patent applications, and the approach to intent standards in post-grant
issues must be more objective across the board, so that antitrust’s
“swords” can be used more often in patent cases involving allegations of
a patentee’s misconduct in order to deter future misconducts, start
putting an end to reliance on patents for “illegitimate reasons” and,
ultimately, minimize the cost from legal errors. However, it is important
to note that this article does not suggest by any means that antitrust
competition authorities should assume responsibilities in the initial
review of patent applications or that the patentee’s “improper”
subjective intent for patenting should make a perfectly valid patent
unenforceable. The article has argued, however, that although subjective
intent for patenting should not be viewed as a red light at the intersection
between the patent system and antitrust laws, it must be an important
arrow that directs the traffic when other signs are invisible, as was the
case in Dippin’ Dots.

147.

See generally COHEN ET AL., supra note 4.
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